Measuring the military strength of a nation is not an easy thing to do — as times change, tactics, equipment and principles must change too. Armies that cannot adapt to new circumstances, even if they have superiority in troop numbers, often fail to overcome challenges on the battlefield. Examples such as the Polish-Soviet War in the 1920s or the 2006 Lebanon War demonstrate how the history of armies held in high regard because of their prestige can still be outperformed by better-suited, better-organized forces. Our modern age is one such period of technological and structural transition in which military doctrines must be rethought to remain relevant.
Maneuver warfare — a system of speed, initiative and rapid movement that emphasizes large gains in a short time for success on the battlefield — is a doctrine famous for its flashy, eye-catching style. The most memorable example in history is the “Blitzkrieg” (Lightning War) from World War II, in which German troops disastrously outperformed French and British forces despite having better coordination and equipment in some capacities. Other modern examples include the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the 2003 Invasion of Iraq and the various battles fought during the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. The common characteristic is that success on the battlefield was often defined by rapid gains of territory in a matter of days.
The side effect of such strategies is that they create a false sense of understanding of the nature of warfare. The development and deployment of new weapon systems are often counted on as “game-changers” and “wonder weapons,” and the tactical disadvantages of this doctrine are overlooked, especially in modern warfare. That is why, though war is always a tragedy, it is useful to understand deeper nuances of the future of conflicts by looking into battlefield strategies.
A major disadvantage of maneuver warfare is the amount of highly trained troops equipped with sophisticated gear to achieve meaningful advancements. The most recent example in this regard is the incursion of Ukrainian forces into Kursk back in August. Initially hailed as a genius strategy and a major blow to the Russian war effort, the attempts to capture strategic targets such as junctions, pipelines and a nuclear power plant have all failed in the face of ongoing attrition problems. Maneuver warfare requires speed, but that speed can only be sustained with adequate supply chains, which is difficult to control in the face of new developments in drone technology and intelligence. The current state of the battle is unequivocally a drain on Ukrainian resources, proven by the steady decline of strength faced in the critical frontline zones stretching Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia.
Another point that makes speed-based tactics unsustainable is the element of intelligence. Long before an army can commit its forces (ideally the best trained and equipped ones) to a spearhead operation, those troops need to accumulate where they will be needed, which takes time. Vehicles, tactical gear, ammunition and weapons must be supplied adequately, and the long stretches of time required for troop mobilization on a large scale give away the element of surprise. A sudden charge of cavalry or a rapid breakthrough of armored vehicles could wreak havoc in wars fought generations ago. Today, it is much easier to actively gather data from the battlefield for defense preparations, taking away the advantage of a surprise move that can otherwise cause chaos to the enemy. The ongoing war in Ukraine is again a good example of this issue, with the failed counteroffensive attacks in the summer of 2023 casting doubt over the usefulness of tanks and planes supplied by Western countries.
The second point becomes more relevant not in relation to any ongoing wars but theoretical conflicts in the future, where major forces might become engaged in battles. Risks of the war in Gaza escalating to a broader regional war or a potential conflict between China and Taiwan appear to be the two most immediate examples — planning and organization of troop capabilities must be devised according to local geography and use of air power to disrupt supply lines rather than hoping for a quick and decisive victory. Maintaining a consistent rate of hardware production is now one of the glaring issues of the American military industry and maintaining an advantage in ammunition output is going to be essential for all future geopolitical strategies concerning the deployment of soldiers in foreign conflicts.
Longtime readers will attest to my personal dedication to diplomacy and peaceful means, which might make my arguments for strategic reform in anticipation of future wars a surprise. Nevertheless, especially for a major power such as the United States, having an advantage over the development of technology and doctrines is now a key priority — the U.S. Army must emphasize reforming its combined arms tactics and network of intelligence to guarantee the continuous support and strength of its forces on any given battlefield. I am not arguing against maneuver warfare in its entirety, but modern circumstances make it a very unreliable tactic to utilize. Rather, the future of the military strength of the United States rests upon how efficient the military command structure and industry are.
Deniz Gulay is a sophomore double-majoring in history and Russian.
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