This week, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas asked the United Nations Security Council to recognize Palestine as a state. The move was largely symbolic; if ratified, it would mean only titular statehood and voting rights in the U.N. General Council. And the Security Council is not expected to vote, or even begin debate, on the issue in the foreseeable future.
This bid and its effects indicate the United States’ waning influence in the Middle East. A weak economy, burdened military and political intransigence all mean the U.S. can no longer strong-arm allies there. The Arab Spring only exacerbated this weakness.
Nevertheless, the move is a powerful political statement, both because it signals an end to the standstill in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and because Palestinian statehood is seen as having strong international support.
But even if the Security Council would recommend that Palestine be declared a state, as is expected, the U.S. has promised to use its veto power on the Security Council to render votes useless.
If no compromise is reached, the U.S. will further widen the gap that has grown between itself and its Arab allies in the region.
In particular, the U.S. faces a calamity in its relations with two of its biggest allies in the Middle East, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Its relationship with Saudi Arabia has been strained for decades, but both countries recognize the mutual benefit they receive through cooperation: the U.S. gets cheap oil, and the Saudis get cheap weapons.
But the Palestine issue could change that. Saudi Arabia believes strongly in the creation of a Palestinian state. Beyond the direct issue of Palestinian statehood, the Saudis recognize that their patronage of a Palestinian state could lend legitimacy to the ever-embattled ruling family. The Saudi population — and most of the Muslim world — supports the creation of a Palestinian state, so government support means a boost in popularity for the royal family.
Further, Saudi Arabia sees the Palestine issue as one in which Iran could meddle. The Saudis realize they must buttress Palestinian support vis-à-vis Iran or risk losing what could soon be an important regional ally. Losing Saudi Arabia as an ally would be disastrous for the U.S. interests. We receive oil, intelligence and a base for our troops from the state.
Turkey, too, is on the the brink of breaking ties with Washington. Changes in the makeup of its population and governance have already gravitated Egypt towards more regional alliances, and it has grown increasingly staunch in its support of the Palestinian people.
The U.S. is facing a crisis. It has essentially lost Pakistan as an ally, and the rest of its allies teeter on the edge. Right now, they are probably going to withdraw themselves entirely from our orbit. That leaves Israel as our only ally.
So Israel must make a determination: Is it more dangerous to have a Palestinian state, or to be surrounded by hostile, heavily armed nations?
However, this could all be avoided. Abbas has signaled that he would be willing to negotiate with Israel if preconditions — not unreasonable ones at that — are set.
This is unquestionably the better of the two options. Instead of pressuring the PA to drop its statehood bid, the United States should be asking Israel to make some concessions. And Israel should, no, needs to recognize that while it may be painful and perhaps unpopular domestically, negotiations are the clearest way to resolution. Refusal to do so could signal its most serious existential crisis yet. It is hardly a tough choice.