Taiwan stands at a crossroads when it comes to defense. Its leadership must determine the strategies the nation will embrace against a potential — if not a likely — invasion from China. Beijing has, in recent times, emphasized its aim to bring an end to the decades-long stalemate between the mainland and the island, with a peaceful resolution of this conundrum becoming more unlikely with each passing day. With this in mind, Taiwan stands to benefit from not arming itself with more guns, but rather utilizing diplomacy to de-escalate and open the door for dialogue.
For many years, China has been undergoing a significant naval and military buildup that points to what might possibly be the preparations to a military operation. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2024 New Year’s address, in which he declares the “reunification of the motherland is a historical inevitability,” is another sign of this preparation — his rhetoric indicates that the current status quo is ought to come to an end with a Communist triumph over the island.
The most likely element of an invasion scenario would be a naval blockade that cuts off all supply routes to the island at the immediate start of war. Taiwan is an island with only a very limited amount of arable land, making it dependent on food imports to sustain its population. Its economy overall is also vulnerable to such a blockade as Taiwan relies on imported resources for its manufacturing and tech sector as well as oil imports for its energy production.
This potential blockade would make the conflict effectively a war of attrition similar to the Battle of the Atlantic during World War II, in which Britain had to stand against German submarine raids targeting supply lines to starve off the island. Without any direct assistance from the U.S. Navy, this could potentially make the island lose strength and capitulate over time rather than suddenly through a shock-and-awe plan.
Another difficult issue to overcome would be air defense. The proximity of the island to the mainland makes it very vulnerable to a systematic bombing effort that can damage infrastructure and industry. Taiwan made significant steps toward increasing its air defense by investing in missile systems, but, still, it may not withstand the attrition caused by a total blockade in the long run.
Lastly, the most crucial aspect of the Taiwanese military is the soldiers themselves. A report from the Washington Post published on Aug. 3 indicates that Taiwanese troops lack improvements in professionalism and morale, essential components for an army preparing to be on the defense. This recent analysis lays out the key issues in a defeatist attitude against the superior numbers of Communist forces, difficulties in amassing sufficient reserves and a lack of public trust in the military.
All of these are major disadvantages to Taiwanese war efforts, which emboldens China to be more aggressive about this issue. This is the current danger of the situation, which, in an ironic way, benefits none of the involved parties. In a war scenario, China risks its own economy, which is dependent on being connected to global trade, though Taiwan risks a lot more when overwhelmed by superior firepower and a lethal blockade by sea.
At the same time, the question of being or not being involved in this situation is also critical to United States interests as well — together with Ukraine and Israel, Taiwan is one of the key zones of risk where the United States expresses a strong political position. Turning back from its commitments would make the United States abandon a strategic partner, which would further de-legitimize its position as a superpower while assisting Taiwan with more arms supplies. It also plays into a dangerous game of brinkmanship, which is terrible in the face of a nuclear escalation scenario. For Taiwan, further military spending only leads to making war more likely without bringing any meaningful battlefield advantage. For the United States, being involved outright means further escalation as well, while pulling out of its political commitments and humiliating itself on the world stage.
The solution is a dual strategy of diplomacy and deterrence. Losing its seat at the United Nations might have cost Taiwan political legitimacy, but accepting the status quo as a lost cause today and opening dialogue between itself and Beijing can instead devalue the Communist rhetoric for conquest. The diplomatic process in such a case ought to be incredibly arduous for both sides, but it can also open the road for the kind of normalization previously seen between North and South Korea, denying any justification for war in the long run.
Deterrence is the trickier side of this strategy, but it is also feasible. What Beijing currently benefits from is the ambiguity of United States-Taiwan relations, which does not determine the United States’ responsibility to defend the island. Simultaneously making it clear that the U.S. Navy would indeed be involved in a conflict and opening the door for talks makes it possible to, at least, buy enough time to weather the “eventual reunification” argument, which currently fuels the appetite for war in Beijing.
Preventing war and pushing for diplomacy benefits Taiwan by denying aggression, serves the United States by making it an arbiter in this case and can garner China diplomatic respect for engaging in a dialogue process. Emphasizing military strength alone cannot benefit Taiwan meaningfully — it is time to consider diplomacy as a way out of this geopolitical paradox.
Deniz Gulay is a sophomore majoring in history.
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